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Alternative Dispute Resolution for Stakeholders in International 
Investment Law 
 
 
DAVID COLLINS ⃰ 
 
ABSTRACT: This article discusses several alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) 
mechanisms that intend to address complaints from civil society stakeholder groups that may 
suffer as a consequence of foreign direct investment (‘FDI’). ADR methods such as 
mediation are well suited to resolving international investment disputes of this nature because 
these methods are more accessible to such stakeholders in the developing world where 
conventional fora such as civil courts may be unavailable, not independent or else too 
expensive. The article explores common stakeholder grievance procedures within the 
international development banks that fund investment projects in the developing world.  It 
then examines the national contact points (‘NCP’) procedures established under the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as a new office maintained 
by the Canadian government for complaints regarding foreign investment in the extractive 
sector. The article concludes by recommending ways in which participation in these types of 
processes by investors and other stakeholders can be improved through mandatory provisions 
in international investment agreements (‘IIA’)s.  
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Developing countries are becoming more dependent on foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) as 
an alternative to aid as a means of development. This shift should be viewed as a positive step 
towards the economic independence of these countries.  FDI offers significant economic 
benefits such as enhanced exports, government income from concessions, employment, 
technology transfer, and improvement to infrastructure.  Importantly it also encourages 
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economic stability and long term self-reliance.1 Yet FDI also brings with it risks to host states 
and its people.  In addition to the danger of recession that could result from the sudden 
expatriation of capital as well as the risk of displacement of nascent local industry, poorly 
managed FDI can cause environmental degradation, risk to human and animal health and 
safety and erosion of local culture.  FDI in the extractive sector in particular often entails 
significant negative impacts, presenting long term hazards that require careful management 
and mitigation, often in consultation with local communities. There is consequently growing 
international pressure to ensure that foreign investors are held responsible for their operations 
which may adversely affect citizens in host states.2   
The necessity of greater accountability on the part of multinational enterprises 
(‘MNE’)s to local citizens must be viewed in the context of academic commentary 
emphasizing the one-sided nature of the legal regime governing international investment, 
namely the network of more than 2500 international investment agreements (‘IIA’)s that are 
typically enforced through confidential investor-state arbitration allowing for little public 
involvement. International investment law has been criticized for serving the interests of 
western MNEs to the peril of vulnerable host states in the developing world, or more 
pointedly, the people who live in them.3 This latter distinction reflects the reality that host 
states are often complicit in human rights, labour and environmental abuses in order to attract 
FDI through weaker regulation. This article does not intend to add voice to this view of 
international investment law; indeed many modern IIAs are beginning to reflect sensitivity to 
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the social concerns of host states.4  However, simply empowering host states to regulate FDI 
in the sphere of domestic public policy by balancing the rights and obligations contained in 
IIAs is insufficient.  In order for the concerns of civil society stakeholders (meaning 
individuals or groups other than investors and governments)  to be addressed fully, these 
people  need direct access to dispute settlement against foreign investors. Such dispute 
settlement must be practical, meaning that it must be affordable, independent, meaning that it 
must not be coerced in any way, and it must offer the possibility of achieving workable 
solutions. A number of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms for these groups have 
appeared in recent years, both demonstrating an increasing awareness of the importance of 
stakeholder rights within international investment law, as well as justifying further academic 
study in this area.  
 This article will accordingly examine informal dispute settlement mechanisms that are 
available to such stakeholder groups in the developing world that have been or may be 
adversely affected by FDI.  It will argue that alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) involving 
strategies such as mediation are an important means by which the grievances of civil society 
stakeholders against foreign investors can be addressed.  The article will begin by briefly 
outlining the advantages of ADR and the shortcomings of existing international investment 
arbitration in terms of practical access for stakeholders other than investors and governments. 
It will then discuss some of the informal systems of dispute settlement available to affected 
groups and individuals through the international development banks which provide funding 
and insurance for some of the FDI in developing countries. Informal dispute settlement 
processes established by the home states of MNEs will then be explored, specifically those 
operated under the auspices of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
and a new alternative dispute resolution process that has been created by the government of 
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Canada to monitor the operations of Canadian MNEs in the extractive sector.  Finally, the 
article will suggest ways in which up-take of these ADR procedures could be improved by 
inserting obligations in the text of IIAs concluded between capital exporting and capital 
importing states. 
 
 
II   CIVIL SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS ACCESS TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
A) Advantages of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Access to justice can be significantly improved through the implementation of alternative 
dispute ADR methods such as mediation or conciliation. The advantages of ADR are well-
recognized by commentators.5  Broadly speaking, civil trials as well as arbitration necessarily 
involve a winner and a loser and the associated adversarial procedure can alienate parties 
from one another.  This is particularly problematic in situations where parties wish to sustain 
a long-term relationship, as might be the case in a large scale foreign investment project. In 
contrast, ADR is consensual and aimed at reaching a mutually satisfactory solution.  ADR 
can bring specialized knowledge to the dispute which may be unavailable in conventional 
domestic courts, although this advantage is less relevant for treaty arbitration in dedicated 
investment tribunals.  As with civil courts of many domestic legal systems, even specialized 
investment arbitration facilities must adhere to a set of procedural rules, such as those 
regarding evidence. These can be inflexible, removing control from the parties. While ADR 
mechanisms vary, they are typically not tied to a fixed procedural framework because they 
favour practical solutions that require compromise and negotiation.  Furthermore, ADR 
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processes are likely to be less expensive than domestic courts or international arbitration 
because as they are less legalized and do not require the establishment of liability, specialized 
legal counsel will be un-necessary. Since many ADR services can move to on-site location or 
operate remotely through telecommunications, there is no burden to travel, also reducing 
expense.  Finally, more formal procedures can be intimidating to non-commercial parties, 
especially those from cultures that are not familiar with adversarial court-room style 
proceedings.  In this sense ADR is much more accessible and practical for use by civil 
society stakeholder groups in the developing world. 
  A common method of ADR is mediation. In mediation, a neutral third party helps 
both sides to reach an agreement that each side considers to be acceptable.  It can be either 
evaluative, in which the mediator gives an assessment of the legal merits of a case, or 
facilitative, where the mediator focuses on assisting the parties in defining the issues.  Where 
mediation is successful, meaning that an agreement is reached, parties can subsequently 
decide to formalize the agreed solution in a binding contract.  In another type of ADR known 
as conciliation, the third party adopts a more interventionist role in bringing the two parties 
together and in suggesting possible solutions. The term mediation now tends to include 
conciliation and may also encompass fact-finding as well as ombudsmen.  Ombudsmen are 
independent office holders who investigate and make decisions regarding complaints from 
the public relating to maladministration, often using mediation as part of their dispute 
resolution procedures.6 ADR is now widely used.  The national courts of England and Wales 
are required to undertake case management by encouraging the parties to use ADR if the 
court considers it appropriate to resolve the case7 and parties are now encouraged to seek 
non-court settlements where possible in order to reduce costs and delay.  Similar policies 
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exist in other jurisdictions, resulting in the increasing popularity of ADR relative to standard 
civil adjudication in both common law8 and civil law systems.9 China in particular has a long 
tradition of employing mediation as a means of resolving disputes.10  ADR, especially 
mediation, has enjoyed broad support as an effective means of dispute settlement in the 
international context by a number of commentators.11 The UN Charter expressly refers to 
ADR techniques including conciliation and mediation, in addition to judicial settlement, as a 
peaceful way of resolving disputes between states.12 
 
 
B) Limited Access to Justice for Civil Society Stakeholders in International Investment 
Disputes 
Stakeholders in communities affected by FDI have little recourse against foreign investors in 
their domestic civil courts because of a lack of accessible legal infrastructure at home and 
abroad.  Domestic courts in the developing world are often underfunded, unaffordable or 
lacking independence.13 Moreover, most disputes brought under IIAs do not normally deal 
with the kinds of broader concerns that are faced by civil society groups, such as 
employment, culture and general social well-being.   This is because IIAs have the primary 
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function of providing substantive and procedural protection for investors.  Individuals and 
communities may thus attempt to obtain redress for their complaints through the courts of the 
home state of the multinational investor. Courts in some home states of MNEs have been 
willing to recognize jurisdiction over claims arising from civil wrongs committed abroad.  
Instruments such as the US Alien Tort Claims Act14 or judicial rulings as in the UK’s Lubbe v 
Cape15 have been used in the manner. However as noted above, conventional litigation may 
be undesirable for many stakeholders, primarily because it can be prohibitively expensive for 
non-commercial parties, especially when taking place in a foreign jurisdiction. Moreover, 
civil litigation of this nature may be inappropriate for less formal complaints rooted in foreign 
investors’ lack of sensitivity to local community needs that fall short of full civil wrongs 
requiring proof of negligence.   
International tribunals provide limited assistance to civil society stakeholders for 
claims against foreign investors.  Investor-state arbitration relating to breaches of IIAs 
through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’)16  can 
admit non-party amicus curiae-type participants, but this has been done in very limited 
situations, requiring the consent of both the investor and the state parties,17 and again this is 
highly formalized arbitration that can be inaccessible, especially if taking place overseas.  
ICSID does offer an informal conciliation procedure for resolving disputes, however, unlike 
ICSID’s arbitration facility, conciliation is only available to state parties or investor parties; 
there is no provision to allow non-parties to take part in it.18 UNCITRAL arbitration rules,19 
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which are often used in international commercial arbitration between two investors, have no 
provision for non-party participation, nor do they contemplate use of ADR.  Some of the 
World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) agreements are relevant to international investment, 
notably the General Agreement on Trade in Services (‘GATS’), however the dispute 
settlement system within the WTO is only available to the organization’s Member states. 
Non-parties such as NGOs have been allowed on occasion to make submissions during the 
formal panel and Appellate Body hearings.20 Whether civil society stakeholders have ever 
participated in the WTO’s confidential ADR facility (good offices, conciliation and 
mediation) is unknown.21  
While the potential for amicus curiae type submissions in these fora should be viewed 
in a positive light because they have enhanced access to justice communities and individuals, 
they remain inadequate for two principle reasons. First, non-party participation in this manner 
requires than there is an existing dispute, either between two investors, two countries, or an 
investor and a state. These situations will not always capture harms suffered by vulnerable 
groups which may have limited financial impact to the point that they are escalated to full 
disputes. Second, even in situations where a dispute has arisen, informal dispute settlement 
techniques such as ADR do not appear to contemplate civil society stakeholder involvement, 
the very situation where ADR is most needed.  
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 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UN General Assembly Resolution 31/98.  It may be 
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III   DEVELOPMENT BANK ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR CIVIL 
SOCIETY STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Partly in recognition of the gap in stakeholder access described above, there is a growing 
trend among the world’s leading development banks, which provide financial support for 
development-related projects, to establish internal accountability mechanisms in order to 
resolve complaints from project-affected groups.22  The extent to which these implement 
ADR will now be briefly discussed in order to illustrate the efficacy of ADR in the 
international investment context. 
 
A) The World Bank 
The most important of the development banks is the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, better known as the World Bank Group, which is an international 
institution that provides leveraged loans for poorer countries for programs aimed at poverty 
reduction.  It maintains the Inspection Panel, which is a grievance procedure that is available 
for use by project-affected individuals.  The World Bank’s Inspection Panel is an internal 
dispute settlement body established to evaluate whether the contract between the bank and a 
borrowing investor follows the bank’s operational policies regarding responsible 
investment.23  During this process, affected groups of persons, meaning at least two 
individuals, located in a project-affected country may submit a complaint for failure of the 
Bank (not of the borrower itself) to comply with Bank policies concerning financing an 
investment project and this has affected them in a material way.  Requests for inspection, 
which may be submitted in any language, can also be submitted before anticipated harm has 
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 See generally R Bissell and S Nanwani, ‘Multilateral Development Bank Accountability Mechanisms: 
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occurred.  Requests may be made by telephone, e-mail or in writing to the Bank’s 
headquarters in Washington DC and the complainants may keep their identities confidential if 
they wish.  If the request passes the early stages of the panel’s scrutiny, a fact-finding mission 
to the affected project site may take place.  After concluding its investigation and assessment, 
the Panel issues a report on the request which includes a recommended course of action.24  
Whereas at one time the Panel had been criticized for its lack of transparency,25 a database of 
the 72 cases that the Panel has evaluated, as of June 2011, is now maintained on the World 
Bank’s website, including all of its reports and recommendations.  Recommendations are 
submitted to the management of the World Bank itself, which may then be passed on to the 
investors in order for them to bring the project into compliance with the recommendations.  It 
is unclear what the result will be if Bank borrowers do not implement these 
recommendations, such as whether some form of sanction may be applied.  Indeed one of the 
chief criticisms of the Inspection Panel is its failure to engage in long-term monitoring of 
recommendations following the initial dispute resolution phase.26 Moreover, the Inspection 
Panel process does not appear to involve participation of the investor itself at any stage.  The 
process is therefore clearly intended to facilitate dialogue and improve relations between the 
Bank and the public, not between international investors and the public.  
The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman is an independent agency that responds to 
complaints against two of the World Bank’s development agencies established for assisting 
private investors with projects that have a development purpose: the International Finance 
Corporation (‘IFC’) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (‘MIGA’). The IFC 
fosters sustainable economic growth in developing states by financing private sector loans for 
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specific projects such as highways, dams, factories and other large scale infrastructure 
projects.  Generally the IFC helps private companies investing in emerging economies 
acquire capital as well as improve their corporate governance. MIGA supplies financial 
insurance for investors against non-commercial risks in developing host states.  It also 
operates a dispute mediation service; however it is only available for disputes between MIGA 
itself, representing the investors for which it has provided a guarantee, and host states.27 
Established in 1999, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman receives complaints from 
individuals or communities that have or may suffer adverse environmental or social 
consequences from investment projects that have received assistance from the IFC or MIGA.  
The Ombudsman’s ambit is wide: complaints relating to any aspect of the planning, 
implementation or impact of an IFC or MIGA supported project may be received at the 
Ombudsman’s office in Washington DC by email or post in any of seven languages. 
Following an initial screening, the Ombudsman will attempt to achieve a collaborative 
settlement between the parties and if this is unsuccessful an audit of the operation may be 
undertaken, which will culminate in recommendations to the World Bank.  The extent to 
which these recommendations are implemented will be monitored over time.  The 
Ombudsman has no direct sanctioning power against the IFC, MIGA or private borrowers, it 
merely encourages parties to adopt the recommendations it tenders following the complaints 
process in order to achieve a satisfactory solution for all parties. The settlement stage may 
include active intervention on the part of the Ombudsman or third party specialists in the 
form of mediation or conciliation, which requires the consent of all parties.28 The Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman has heard approximately 85 cases from developing regions around the 
world. Many of these have implemented mediation or conciliation strategies. 
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B) The African Development Bank 
Established in 1963 and consisting of 53 African and 24 non-African member countries, the 
African Development Bank provides low interest loans to investors investing in development 
oriented projects in Africa.  The Bank maintains the Independent Review Mechanism 
(‘IRM’) which provides a means by which individuals who have or may be adversely 
affected by a Bank-funded project can bring complaints to the Bank.  The newly revised 
process aims to ensure that Bank funded investors bring their activities in line with the 
Bank’s policies regarding social as well as environmental responsibility. Requests may be 
submitted in English or French only by a group, consisting of at least two people where an 
African Development Bank financed project is located to any of the Bank’s regional 
headquarters or by e-mail.  Requesting parties may remain confidential if they so choose. 
Once the request has passed an initial assessment to ascertain its merit, the Director of the 
IRM may either submit the matter to mediation, or else it will be referred to a team of three 
external experts, appointed for five-year terms, for a further Compliance Review assessment. 
The Compliance Review process does not involve the public directly; however the inspectors 
may engage in fact-finding missions during their evaluation of the claims brought against 
investors. The mediation process, described as ‘problem solving’ engages the requesting 
members, members of the African Development Bank, as well as other interested parties, 
although there is no requirement that the investors themselves will take part in this exercise. 
Thus, like the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, the IRM process is aimed at redressing 
grievances between the Bank and the public, not resolving disputes between third parties and 
investing MNEs. The IRM process can culminate in a recommendation to be issued to the 
managers of the African Development Bank which will be followed by monitoring to ensure 
the implementation of changes to the investor’s conduct.  The efficacy of the 
13 
 
recommendations is unclear as it is not evident that the Bank can impose sanctions against 
investors. Requesting parties and stakeholders cannot receive any monetary compensation as 
a result of the IRM process.29 Reports of the IRM regarding accepted requests are published 
on the African Development Bank’s website. Six reports are currently listed.30 It is unclear 
whether mediation was attempted in any of these circumstances. 
 
C) The Asian Development Bank 
The Asian Development Bank extends loans to developing country members for 
development- related projects and also facilitates public and private investment for 
development projects.  Established in 1966, the bank is based in Manila and composed of 67 
Member countries, including 44 developing countries from the region. The Compliance 
Review Panel of the Asian Development Bank investigates alleged noncompliance by the 
bank with its operational policies and procedures concerning the implementation of an 
assisted project that may adversely and materially affect local people. Requests for review of 
the bank’s actions may be submitted to the Panel by a group of at least two people by post or 
e-mail in any of twenty languages using templates forms that are available on-line. The three-
person Panel does not examine the acts or omissions of the borrowing country or the foreign 
or local private investors engaging in the project, but rather the actions of the bank itself in 
that they have not complied with their own guidelines. During the strictly-timed review 
process the Panel will seek comments from the bank as well as requesting parties and then 
issue its findings to the Asian Development Bank’s governing body.  These findings may 
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include remedial changes in the scope or implementation of the relevant project.31 The 
Compliance Review Panel maintains an on-line database of all five requests that have been 
filed, including two requests in 2011 relating to a coal-fired power plant in the Philippines 
and a road project in the Kyrgyz Republic respectively.32 While there is no purview for 
mediation within the Compliance Review process, both the Asian Development Bank 
managers and the requesting parties may submit further comments following the initial 
review and the submission of the Panel’s draft report. The requesting parties and the bank do 
not meet at any time, either face-to-face or virtually. 
 
D)  The Inter-American Development Bank 
The Inter-American Development Bank (‘IADB’) was established in 1959 in order to reduce 
poverty and assist in sustainable development through financing projects in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Its membership consists of 46 countries, including 26 developing 
countries in the region that receive funds.  Its stakeholder complaint facility, the Independent 
Consultation and Investigation Mechanism, was established in February 2010 as a 
modification and enhancement of the earlier system that had been in place since 1994.  The 
Mechanism is an independent forum that receives and processes complaints from 
communities or individuals who allege that they are or might be adversely affected by bank 
funded foreign investment operations. Complaints may be submitted by individuals (one 
person on his or her own) or groups by e-mail or post to the IADB’s office in Washington, 
DC in any of four languages outlining the acts or omissions of the bank in relation to the 
implementation of its operational policies for project funding.  The complaint process, 
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 Asian Development Bank Accountability Mechanism: Operating Procedures for the Compliance Review 
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conducted by three panellists, includes several screening stages, a consultation phase, and a 
compliance review stage in which results are presented and remedies recommended.  The 
process is managed by a Project Ombudsperson who engages with the complainant and 
relevant members of the bank, ultimately issuing a final report. 33 Ten cases are listed on the 
on-line registry of cases which generally involve infrastructure projects such as highways and 
power plants.34 Importantly for the purposes of this article, the consultation phase may 
include active mediation or conciliation, which is designed to be flexible and tailored to the 
needs of each particular case, such as for example whether the harm is to the environment of 
an area, or relates to dangerous working conditions.35 Mediation was used in four of the listed 
cases.36 
 
E) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Established in 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (‘EBRD’) 
provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses engaging in development 
related activities from Europe to Central Asia.  In other words, it lends to both foreign 
governments as well as private investors, including local companies and MNEs operating 
across borders. The EBRD invests in projects that could otherwise attract funding from 
commercial lenders. Generally speaking, the EBRD assists countries in the transition towards 
market economies, while pursuing the objective of environmental sustainability. It maintains 
the Project Complaint Mechanism (‘PCM’), an internal body constituted in 2010 that 
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 Policy Establishing the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism, 17 February 2010 (last 
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evaluates complaints from individuals and local groups that may be directly and adversely 
affected by an investment project funded by the bank.37   
The PCM has two functions: compliance review, wherein a bank approved project is 
assessed for compliance with bank policies; and problem-solving, wherein the PCM attempts 
to facilitate dialogue between the parties and to resolve the underlying issues that led to the 
grievance. This second function resembles ADR in that it may include conciliation and 
mediation as well as independent fact finding. Complaints may be submitted by one or more 
individuals located in an area where a bank project may have an impact, or who have an 
economic interest in an area where there may be such an impact. Requests for problem-
solving must be in writing in one of the four official languages of the bank to its head office 
in London or any of the regional offices. The PCM will screen complaints for legitimacy 
based on the nature of the claims, such as whether it is an environmental or social impact, 
parties and attempts to resolve the matter, for example by use of the client borrower’s internal 
grievance procedure. If the complaint is considered eligible for problem-solving by the PCM, 
then one of four problem-solving experts will be appointed, who will assist the parties in 
achieving agreement and then issue a report outlining the results. Comments may be received 
from all parties on this report before final recommendations are made by the PCM, which are 
published on the European Central Bank’s website, maintaining the confidentiality of the 
complainants.  If during this process the PCM believes that serious or irreparable harm may 
result from the continued operation of the investment, the PCM may recommend a cessation 
of disbursements from the bank to the relevant project.38 Interestingly, unlike some of the 
other development bank complaints systems, the PCM handles complaints that may arise 
between affected individuals and investing borrowers, not only between complainants and the 
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bank itself.39 Five complaints are recorded on the PCM’s on-line register, but only one 
includes a published final report.  This report did not include problem-solving and as such 
there is no indication as to the usage or success of mediation within the new PCM, however 
problem-solving had been used successfully under the PCM’s predecessor body.40 
 
F) Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
While it would be impractical to discuss the dispute settlement mechanisms within all of the 
national development banks in the world, some mention should be made of that of the United 
States, as the home of many of the largest MNEs.  The Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (‘OPIC’) is a branch of the US Government created in 1969 to lend money and 
provide insurance against non-commercial risks to American companies operating 
internationally with a view to assist in economic development and the establishment of 
market economies.41 OPIC’s mandate emphasizes the importance of workers’ rights as well 
as the need for environmental protection in all funded projects.42 Established in 2005, OPIC’s 
Office of Accountability (‘OA’) receives and assesses complaints concerning OPIC-
supported investments from individuals and communities in host states.  The OA process 
consists of problem-solving and compliance review, the former of which may include fact-
finding, dialogue facilitation and mediation.  A request for problem-solving consultation may 
be submitted to the OA by a member or members of the local community who are or who are 
likely to be materially, directly and adversely affected by an OPIC supported project or their 
representatives.  Complaints may involve issues of non-compliance with OPIC policies and 
rules as well as environmental and social concerns, labour and human rights violations. Good 
faith efforts to resolve the complaint must have been made before the request will be 
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reviewed and the complaint must indicate what outcome is sought. Requests can be in 
English or any other language in writing to OPIC’s headquarters in Washington, DC and 
confidentiality of requesting parties will be maintained.  While a precise timeline is not 
specified, the OA will duly review the request, implement the problem solving initiatives 
where necessary and then submit recommendations to the President of OPIC regarding 
potential ways to resolve difficulties.  The Office is empowered to engage outside experts in 
order to resolve specific issues that are raised in the complaints process.43  Reports of the OA 
are disseminated on OPICs website.  To date, problem-solving was sought in only one 
instance; however mediation was not pursued because consent for this procedure was not 
granted by all parties, an essential element of mediation.44 
 
 
G)  Development Bank Dispute Settlement: Overview 
The dispute settlement systems within the development banks are broadly similar in terms of 
their objectives and processes.  Stakeholders are able to bring complaints for possible 
breaches of the lender’s own policies, as well as in some cases regarding actions of the 
investor/ borrower that have led, or will lead to environmental and social harms.  The option 
of mediation is a common feature within this process, as is initial screening and publication 
of the results while maintaining confidentiality.  Dispute settlement mechanisms generally 
result in recommendations only.  Commentators have observed that the development bank 
accountability mechanisms tend to be very user-friendly and accessible, ensuring that 
complainants are able to participate effectively in the process.45 The success of the various 
bank dispute settlement systems in terms of fully addressing the concerns of civil society 
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stakeholders is unclear given their relatively short record and the abbreviated nature of the 
publicly available information. There are indications that mediation has been used 
successfully on a number of occasions.   
While the ADR systems within the development banks should be applauded for 
augmenting access to justice for community groups that may be harmed by FDI, investing 
funded by development banks is only a very minor component of all FDI into the developed 
world.  Many MNEs operating in vulnerable communities will be funded from private 
commercial banks or simply funded by their own institutional investors.  In this regard, a 
large number of the world’s leading private investment banks have adopted the Equator 
Principles, which are guidelines for assessing and managing the social and environmental 
risks in project finance. The Equator Principles require simply that borrowers, not the lending 
banks, make available “grievance mechanisms” for project-affected communities, the precise 
features of which will vary depending on the borrowing institution.46 A more detailed 
analysis of how this principle has been implemented in the context of FDI into the developing 
world is beyond the scope of this article. While many investors declare their adherence to 
Equator Principles, it is unlikely that they will maintain publicly accessible records of either 
how and when these processes have been used or whether they implement ADR techniques 
such as mediation in these situations.  It is expected that civil society will place greater 
demands upon private financiers’ dispute resolution mechanisms in light of advancements in 
these processes within the development banks noted above.47 
 
 
IV   THE OECD NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 
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One of the best recourses for the resolution of disputes against MNEs from individuals or 
groups in the developed world in respect of projects that are not funded by one of the 
development banks are the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(‘OECD’) National Contact Points (‘NCP’)s.  While this article will not examine each of 
these bodies individually, some general trends in civil society stakeholder ADR among the 
NCPs can be explored briefly. Again this will illustrate that informal dispute settlement 
techniques such as mediation have begun to play an important role for non-parties in 
international investment law.  
 
A) The OECD and the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD is a forum for governments to consider and promote policies to improve 
economic and social conditions of people around the world.48  It was established in 1960 and 
consists of 34 member countries, including many of the world’s most advanced nations and 
some of the emerging economies. Each nation provides funding to the organization based on 
their economic size. Collectively these countries represent all regions of the world and 
account for 85% of FDI.49 A major part of the OECD’s mandate is to promulgate model laws 
that facilitate economic growth and development while maintaining sensitivity to social 
concerns such as the environment and human rights as well as improve the accountability of 
companies that operate internationally.  One of its principle instruments in this regard are the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a set of voluntary recommendations relating 
to business ethics, including labour relations, human rights, accountability and disclosure as 
well as environmental protection. Updated most recently in 2011, the Guidelines are adhered 
to by all government members of the OECD which in turn encourage their enterprises to 
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observe the guidelines wherever they operate. It is important to recognize that the guidelines 
are not binding rules and as such there is no requirement that MNEs observe them, nor are 
there any sanctions that can be imposed by national governments for a MNEs’ failure to 
follow them. Indeed the Guidelines have been criticized for their failure to ensure 
investigative and sanctioning powers for breach.50 
 
B) ADR and the OECD National Contact Points 
The Guidelines require adherent states to establish National Contact Points (‘NCP’s) to, 
amongst other roles, handle enquiries and contribute to the resolution of issues that arise as a 
consequence of MNE’s implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances.51 NCPs must 
be visible, accessible, transparent and accountable.  NCPs from each state are meant to be 
functionally equivalent to each other to achieve consistency in Guideline implementation 
around the world.  These bodies can adopt various institutional structures, including 
government offices, groups of senior officials within government, and they may include 
independent experts such as members of the business community.52 Most importantly for the 
purposes of this article, NCPs should offer a forum for discussion to assist the business 
community, worker organizations, non-governmental organizations and other interested 
parties to resolve disputes that are raised by the Guidelines.53 This issue resolution process is 
not explained in detail, however the Guidelines note that there should be an initial assessment 
of enquires to ascertain whether further examination is warranted in each instance.  The NCP 
should offer good offices and a forum for discussion to resolve the issues, which will involve 
a consultation with the parties themselves as well as external parties where relevant.54 If the 
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parties involved agree, the NCP should facilitate access to consensual and non-adversarial 
means of dispute resolution, such as conventional ADR techniques of conciliation or 
mediation.  The results of this process should be made publicly available, subject to sensitive 
information and the need to protect the privacy of stakeholders.  Reports should be issued 
outlining what steps were taken and whether agreement was reached between the parties.55  
Clearly the NCPs are not intended to provide binding decisions on contentious issues but 
rather to assist in reaching agreeable solutions through dialogue and consultation. Mediation 
appears to have been used to resolve disputes brought by communities  to the NCPs on a 
number of occasions.56 Unlike the Development Bank ADR processes, the NCP ADR 
procedures are advantageous to civil society stakeholders because they are inter partes, 
meaning that complainants may interact directly with the investors, albeit with the assistance 
of a neutral third party, rather than simply with representatives of a body that has provided 
funding to the investor and may itself have a limited role in the harmful activity. 
 Complaints should be lodged with the NCP in the state in which the violation of the 
OECD Guidelines has allegedly occurred, namely the host state that has received inward FDI.  
Should the violation of the Guidelines have allegedly occurred in a non-OECD state, 
complaints may be brought in the home state of the MNE.  This feature of the NCPs enhances 
access to justice because it allows complaints to be brought against some of the largest 
foreign investors in the world, as well as their related entities, which often operate in non-
OECD locations where no NCP offices exist, and where other means of dispute resolution are 
likely unavailable. This flexibility has allowed, for example, NCPs in MNE home states of 
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Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden deal with disputes that have arisen in countries 
like Ecuador, Belize, India, the Philippines and Ghana.57 
The ADR processes implemented by the NCPs have been criticized for the lack of a 
requirement that the NCPs must make a statement on the validity of a complaint and the 
associated failure of an MNE to observe the Guidelines when mediation has failed.  In 
addition to this lack of reprimand, the Guidelines do not specify that there are consequences 
for MNEs which refuse to engage in the mediation process.58 These criticisms are 
inappropriate because any pressure upon a party to engage in the mediation process, or to 
conclude it with successful agreement, is fundamentally counter to the spirit of mediation 
which by its nature must not be coerced.  Related complaints that the NCPs are merely 
mediation organizations rather than judicial bodies capable of implementing binding 
judgments59 fail to appreciate the purpose of mediation, which is to achieve a mutually 
satisfactory solution rather than mete punishments or establish guilt. Still, it is not always 
clear why an MNE would be motivated to engage in mediation exercises with citizen groups  
unless there was an incentive to do so.  Observed participation in NCP ADR may be 
explained by the fact that MNEs may advertise their willingness to engage with civil society 
through such processes in the company’s promotional material. This signals a high level of 
ethical awareness which could be attractive to consumers or investors.  Of course such 
disclosures equally reveal that a dispute occurred in the first place, which may be indicative 
of problematic behaviour on the part of the investor.  
While it is not the place to engage in a full critique of the NCPs here, it should be 
noted that NCPs have been further disparaged for inconsistencies in the thoroughness of 
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approach from country to country60 as well as differing treatment of supply chain 
responsibility of foreign investors.61  This latter issue refers to problems of identifying 
responsibility of individual MNEs for particular Guideline failures where a number of 
companies are involved with the delivery of a product or service along a complex global 
supply chain.  A final concern with respect to the NCPs is the way in which they take into 
account changes in corporate ownership that remove a particular investor from an individual 
NCPs control as an office of the home state.  In Malaysia for example, former OECD 
domiciled investors have been taken over by Malaysian companies, removing them from the 
purview of bodies like the NCP.62  One advantage of mediation and other voluntary 
procedures within ADR is that investors would only become involved in these processes 
where they believe that they may be able to contribute meaningfully to the resolution, 
precluding the need for the establishment of responsibility or blame in specific situations. 
  
 
V   THE CANADIAN OFFICE OF THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY COUNSELLOR 
 
In addition to its obligation to maintain an OECD NCP, Canada has created a new additional 
ADR body to improve civil society stakeholder access to justice arising from FDI from 
Canadian extractive sector companies. This demonstrates recognition of the importance of 
providing meaningful access to dispute settlement for individuals and communities  as well 
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as some of the deficiencies observed in the above noted development bank and NCP 
facilities. 
 
A) Origin and Mandate 
The Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counsellor (‘The 
Office’) was created in October 2009 to review the corporate social responsibility practices of 
Canadian extractive sector MNEs operating abroad and to receive and attempt to resolve 
complaints brought by individuals or communities resulting from the actions of these 
companies.63 Unlike many of the NCPs, the Office is totally independent from the 
government; its employees are appointed for limited terms and are not directly answerable to 
any government department.  This distance is intended to give the office objectivity and to 
remove any potential political influence from constituents within Canada.64 The performance 
guidelines that the Office implements are the International Finance Corporation’s 
Performance Standards, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Global 
Reporting Initiative and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations. Although a full 
discussion of these instruments is beyond the scope of this article, a few brief comments on 
the first three should be made, as the OECD Guidelines have already been mentioned. 
The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Responsibility outline borrowing clients’ duties and responsibilities for 
managing projects that have received IFC funding.  They include requirements relating to 
labour and working conditions, pollution and community health, biodiversity and sustainable 
development as well as cultural preservation.  In addition to identifying and managing risks 
in these areas, foreign investors following these standards are required to disclose 
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information relating to actual or potential impacts that may result from their activities.65 The 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights are a set of non-binding principles 
developed in 2000 to balance the need for safety and security in commercial operations 
against risks to the human rights of workers and communities.  Established through dialogue 
between NGOs, governments, and the extractive sector industry, the Voluntary Principles are 
not affiliated with an institution, nor are they linked to financial support for development-
related FDI. The principles acknowledge that MNEs play an important role in safeguarding 
human rights and should consequently engage in risk assessment and monitoring of potential 
human rights abuses that may arise as a consequence of their operations, including those 
relating to the use of force. Companies must be sensitive to adverse impacts that may arise 
from companies’ use of private security to protect investment property.66 Lastly, the Global 
Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines consist of principles for ensuring the 
quality of information reported by organizations relating to their economic, social and 
environmental performance.  These Guidelines are intended for use by all varieties of 
organizations, including MNEs, and generally embody a commitment to accuracy, 
transparency as well as clarity in performance data disclosure. The primary policy objective 
of the guidelines is one of sustainability; organizations should be forthright in demonstrating 
the impacts of their activities upon future generations.67  Based in the Netherlands, the Global 
Reporting Initiative describes itself as a network-based organization68, not affiliated with any 
government, but maintaining strategic alliances with the OECD. 
The relationship between the new Office and Canada’s existing NCP is 
complementary. Canada’s OECD NCP is charged with disseminating the OECD Guidelines 
                                                          
65
 International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, 30 
April 2006 
66
 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: 
<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary_principles_english.pdf> (last visited  July 2011) 
67
 Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Version 3.1, 2000-2011 
68
 <http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/> (last visited  July 2011) 
27 
 
as well as contributing to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the implementation of 
the Guidelines in specific instances.  The NCP, not the Office, is therefore the primary 
authority in Canada concerning the OECD Guidelines.  A request for review from a 
stakeholder concerning the OECD Guidelines should be referred to the NCP and not to the 
Office, even if it is with respect to an extractive sector investor.  If the review relates to other 
performance standards, such as those of the IFC, then the Office will take the lead and 
consult with the NCP on the OECD Guidelines issues. Thus close cooperation between the 
two organizations is contemplated.  Indeed, each body should inform the other when it 
receives a request for review in order to identify areas of special expertise.69  In that sense the 
Office will deal with issues that have a somewhat narrower focus than the more general 
OECD Guidelines. Clearly also the Office is concerned only with the breaches of standards 
by extractive sector companies, reflecting the highly instructive nature of this type of FDI in 
terms of environmental degradation and labour conditions.  Indeed it is worth noting that of 
the 124 recorded cases that have been brought before the NCPs around the world as of June 
2011, 51 cases (or almost half) have been in the extractive/mining sector.70 This approach, in 
which sensitivity to issues that are particular to the extractive sector can be fostered, is also 
believed to be unique to international accountability mechanisms worldwide.71 
As part of its larger role the Office aims to reduce negative impacts from FDI, 
increase community benefits from projects and maximize the potential local benefits of 
resource exploitation.  During the consultation phase of the Office’s creation, input was 
sought from stakeholder groups (both civil society and industry) within Canada as well as in 
Mexico, Mali and Senegal. The Office’s mandate is two-fold: to review the corporate social 
responsibility (‘CSR’) practices of Canadian extractive sector companies operating outside of 
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Canada in the context of these standards, and to advise stakeholders on the implementation of 
the endorsed performance standards.   
 
B) Review Mechanism 
Most importantly for the purposes of this article, the Office embodies a review mechanism 
which is essentially a dispute resolution process informed by a multi-perspective (all 
stakeholder) dialogue. This mediation-structured dispute mechanism responds to the interest 
expressed during consultations for “a safe space for constructive problem-solving”72 rather 
than an adversarial legal procedure resulting in a binding ruling that could exacerbate existing 
tensions between investors and host state groups, one of the traditional advantages of ADR 
over litigation. The review process permits Canadian mining, oil or gas project-affected 
communities, groups or individuals to bring a request before the Office’s Counsellor, who 
operates out of Toronto, Canada’s largest city and world centre of mining finance. The 
Counsellor may also travel to project-affected areas to facilitate the resolution of complaints. 
 The review process of the Office is structured as follows:  First, a request for review 
is submitted to the office in Toronto in writing in English or French by an individual, group 
or community that believes it has been adversely affected by a Canadian extractive sector 
company operating in a country other than Canada. Complaints can also be brought by 
Canadian extractive sector companies who believe they are the subject of unfounded 
allegations relating to a specific CSR policy, and a responding party can be identified. Only 
publicly available (non-confidential information) may form the basis of the request and the 
identity of the requesting party is normally shared with the responding party – situations in 
which this will not be done are unspecified but presumably this might occur if there was fear 
of intimidation. Parties must also identify their desired outcome from the review process. The 
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Office will send an acknowledgement to the person(s) making the request within five days. It 
will then assess the eligibility of the requesting party, making a decision within a maximum 
of forty days.  
The activities which form the basis of the complaint must have occurred after the 
Office was created, must be tied to one of the above noted CSR-related guidelines, and 
importantly, an effort must have been made to resolve the situation. This stage could thus be 
described as a summary dismissal or screening mechanism, similar to that of the 
Development Banks and OECD NCPs. If the request is accepted, the CSR Counsellor will 
request a letter of intent to participate from the parties and once this is received, she will 
engage in informal mediation with the relevant parties in order to build trust, a process which 
will take no more than 120 days.  If necessary after this stage, the CSR Counsellor and the 
parties may engage in further informal mediation that includes structured dialogue.  During 
this stage, also limited to 120 days, the Office mediator will travel to the affected community 
and meet with the individuals concerned. The parties have the option to work with a formal 
mediator that is external to the Office in order to resolve any issues of concern. The CSR 
Counsellor may assist in the appointment of a suitable mediator for this purpose. As the 
process is voluntary, parties are free to withdraw at any time and the Office has no powers to 
order the production of evidence relating to disputed claims. Finally, the CSR Counsellor will 
write reports about the requests for review, including final public reports at the end of the 
process.73 A possible outcome would likely involve recommendations for improved relations 
between the parties. Although the Office does not have direct sanctioning power under 
Canadian domestic law, it is believed that its actions and words, as indicated in the final 
reports that the Counsellor issues, can have reputational impact on the investor in question, be 
it positive or negative. It is thought that the Office’s understanding of the issues can also 
                                                          
73
 Review Process, <http://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellor-conseiller_rse/index.aspx> (last visited July 
2011) 
30 
 
influence stakeholders who look to it as a source of expertise.74 These claims are somewhat 
suspect given that requesting parties can choose to have their identities kept confidential, 
meaning that they will not be published in any reports or on the Office’s website.75   
Many questions remain unanswered regarding the Office’s performance thus far. It is 
not clear how many consultations have been launched or how many reports have been issued 
by the Counsellor, as none appear to have been made public yet.  One or two requests for 
consultations are anticipated per year, although this is expected to increase as stakeholders 
become aware that the mechanism is available to them.76 There has been no information 
released from the Office on the nature of the issues that have come before the Office during 
its first years of operation, such as whether they have primarily involved environmental, 
labour / human rights matters, or if there have been allegations of bribery / corruption 
involving host state officials or courts.  No reports have been issued from the Office, 
although it is expected that this will happen in the near future, likely through the Office’s 
official website, as is the practice with the development bank complaints mechanisms and the 
OECD NCPs.  The Office has stated that there has been 100% participation in the process by 
Canadian mining companies so far.77 Given the extent of involvement of industry in the 
initial establishment of the Office, it may be expected that there will be a relatively high 
degree of uptake by Canadian extractive MNEs in this process. 
It is not clear whether complainant citizen groups in foreign countries can 
meaningfully access this process on the other side of the world other than through letters, 
telephone calls and e-mails, if these means of communication are even reliably available in 
all host states. The remoteness of the Office from its users was criticized during the 
development stage.  The NGO OECD Watch, an international network of civil societies 
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promoting corporate accountability, was particularly vocal in this regard.78 Given that success 
has been observed in other remote or on-line mediation fora,79 including with the 
development banks and NCPs, there is no reason why the Office’s location in Canada should 
necessarily be problematic. Moreover, the fact that the Office’s CSR Counsellor can travel in 
person to the affected communities should obviously improve the efficacy of the process. 
While project affected communities have apparently been notified of the Office’s existence, 
the Office concedes that the functionality of the consultations is limited by the capacity to 
communicate with individuals in often poorly developed areas.80 In this regard, NGOs are 
envisioned as a kind of interlocutor; it is hoped that these agencies may inform stakeholders 
about the existence of the Office as contact points, especially in rural communities. NGOs 
may represent affected communities provided that a clear and direct relationship between the 
NGO and the people is demonstrated.81 The Office aims to raise awareness of its existence 
among NGOs and community groups, as well as the academic community before complaints 
occur in order to resolve complaints before any irreversible harm occurs.82 
The Office may have already achieved an important objective for the government of 
Canada as well as Canadian MNEs who were consulted during its inception. The Office acts 
as a signalling device to host states that Canadian outward FDI in the extractive sector is 
more committed to safeguarding stakeholder interests than that from other countries.  This 
may serve to augment Canada’s extractive sector FDI flows into the developing world. This 
strategy is partially reflected in the Canadian government’s various official publications on 
the Office which refer explicitly to CSR adoption as an aspect of “the Canadian 
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Advantage.”83 Perceived socially responsible FDI may also be appealing to portfolio or 
institutional investors who seek ethical companies in which to invest, as well as consumers of 
Canadian products. As such the Office may assist in building the reputation of Canadian 
extractive companies with a view to enhancing their capacity for capital generation. The 
Office’s Counsellor has acknowledged this role, referring to the diplomatic component of the 
consultation process; open engagement with business is an important aspect of strengthening 
‘brand Canada.’84 
 
 
VI   AUGMENTING UPTAKE OF ADR BY STAKEHOLDERS AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTORS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
While it is too early to tell how the Canadian Office will be received by civil society  and 
investors, based on the information that is publicly available on the internet there appears to 
have been some success in the usage of the ADR facilities of the Development banks and the 
NCPs, as noted above. Further research into the practical benefits derived from these services 
within  community groups is warranted.  For the time being, it is suggested that these types of 
procedures should be made more readily available to civil society stakeholders and investors 
should be encouraged to participate in them in good faith. This will help ensure that FDI 
developing regions is conducted in a manner that is sensitive to the concerns of local people 
who may be unable to have their grievances heard through more conventional dispute 
settlement routes. In order to facilitate more full usage of ADR in international investment 
related disputes, provision for these informal mechanisms could be included in the text of 
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international investment agreements (‘IIA’)s.  The many hundreds of worldwide IIAs, which 
are typically concluded between capital importing and capital exporting states as a means of 
increasing FDI by reducing foreign investors’ exposure to non-commercial risks in host 
states, could augment stakeholder ADR update in two key ways. 
 First, IIAs could require that party governments maintain bodies such as that of the 
Canadian Office, offering structured ADR facilities like mediation and conciliation for 
individuals or groups at risk from FDI activities. In OECD member states this requirement 
could be satisfied by existing NCPs. A treaty-based requirement would compel countries that 
do not already operate NCPs, such as many host states in the developing world, to create a 
dispute settlement service for civil society  groups located within their territory.  This would 
enhance access for local people by obviating the need to deal with a mediator located in 
another country. In host states with insufficient resources to fund these services, such as 
many of the least developed countries in the world, capital exporting treaty parties could be 
required to offer financial assistance for this purpose. IIA parties would be further charged 
with advertising the availability of ADR services to communities and NGOs, which could be 
achieved with assistance from foreign investors. Additionally, IIAs would include a ‘best 
efforts’ clause in which party states would encourage investors to participate in these 
voluntary ADR initiatives, in either their home states or in host states where civil society 
stakeholders are resident. Of course, one of the foundational principles of mediation and 
conciliation is that it must be voluntary as it is aimed at identifying problems and reaching a 
mutually acceptable solution through open, non-coerced dialogue.  Consequently any 
encouragement placed upon investors must not reach the level of pressure, such as might 
result from the country’s withholding of key financial incentives for non-participation.  In 
disseminating information about stakeholder ADR facilities to the public and to industry, 
emphasis would need to be placed on the cooperative, non-adversarial character of these 
34 
 
processes. This would undoubtedly foster involvement from investors as well as citizens, who 
might otherwise feel intimidated about bringing claims. 
 The voluntary nature of these processes underscores the second way in which IIAs 
could be used to increase ADR uptake by stakeholders and foreign investors.  Treaty parties 
could foster use of ADR by removing some of the impediments to investors’ participation in 
them.  Thus, IIAs could clearly specify that stakeholder mediation processes should not act as 
a bar to other conventional dispute settlement routes like international investor-state 
arbitration. This assurance would counter any fears of foreign investors that participation in 
ADR would undermine their right to bring their own claims against host states, for example 
under ICSID’s exclusivity requirement.85 Fork-in-the-road clauses common to IIAs which 
compel investors to choose between domestic or international dispute settlement would 
expressly not be engaged by these informal voluntary processes. Furthermore, it must be 
made clear in the text of the IIAs, not simply in the procedural guidelines for each ADR 
facility, that any admissions made by parties during mediation should be strictly on a without 
prejudice basis and accordingly arbitration tribunals or courts should refuse to admit such 
evidence that might be presented in any subsequent formal hearing. A stronger version of this 
assurance would involve a lis pendens type guarantee in the IIA:  treaty parties would 
promise that their domestic courts would refuse jurisdiction or stay existing proceedings in 
connection with a related lawsuit against the same investor until the ADR exercise was 
completed in good faith.86 This guarantee would give ADR procedures a more formal status 
in international law, encouraging investors to pursue it as a way of minimizing their exposure 
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to litigation in other fora.  MNEs would hopefully engage in stakeholder mediation exercises 
as a way of temporarily shielding themselves from other lawsuits.  By analogy to the victim 
status in international human rights law, in order to curtail excessive litigation that would be 
oppressive to investors, access to ADR must also clearly be limited only to individuals who 
are directly affected by the investor’s actions.  
Provisions such as these in IIAs could further increase access to ADR for stakeholders 
if these treaty requirements are supported by the development banks. It is believed that 
development banks, such as MIGA, grant favourable pricing for political risk insurance 
premiums to investors that invest in countries which have signed IIAs.87 In a similar fashion, 
development banks should accord preferential terms in loans and insurance contracts for 
investments in countries that have signed IIAs which contain the above ADR obligations. 
Knowing this, host states would be motivated to include provision for ADR facilities into 
their IIAs because it would make them more attractive (lower cost) destinations for FDI, 
while not actually forcing investors to use the facilities. Equally importantly, the development 
banks must emphasize that borrowers are aware of ADR schemes such as those operated by 
the banks themselves as well as through local NCPs or specialized mechanisms such as the 
Canadian Office.  The banks should require that borrowing investors disclose the availability 
of these procedures to civil society stakeholders as a condition of receiving support.  
Investors should be prompted by the banks to make every effort to meaningfully participate 
in the process, on the understanding that frivolous claims will be duly screened in advance 
and that sensitive information will remain confidential.  Finally, although it was not discussed 
in this article, private project-financiers should be encouraged to bring the existence of these 
informal dispute settlement facilities to the attention of their borrowers in each of the states in 
which they operate. In so doing private banks must emphasize the solution-oriented, dialogue 
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based nature of mediation. This should help to draw investors to these mechanisms as a 
means of enhancing goodwill and ultimately improving their worldwide reputation with 
consumers. It may be that enhanced procedural protections for communities and individuals 
within IIAs, such as those discussed here, will be insufficient on their own. Whether IIAs 
should be expanded in their scope to include substantive protections for civil society or to 
require substantive standards of conduct by investors and thereby address more fully the 
harms that may be caused by FDI is a separate issue.   
 
VII  CONCLUSION 
Vulnerable individuals and communities in developing countries may face hardships as a 
consequence of FDI and yet have little recourse to have these problems resolved because of 
deficient legal infrastructure in their home countries.  As a consequence of this dilemma, 
many international organizations, including the development banks and the OECD have 
established grievance procedures by which members of the public can attempt to achieve 
resolution to disputes that have arisen with foreign investors. Many of these bodies involve 
ADR, including voluntary mediation in which complainant stakeholders and investors engage 
in problem-solving activities under the supervision of a neutral mediator. As a home state of 
many large multinational mining companies, Canada has established a special office to 
facilitate this type of procedure for individuals or groups adversely affected by the extractive 
operations of Canadian MNEs. While the publicly accessible records of these informal 
techniques are limited, until further research is conducted there are indications that these 
ADR processes have been successful on a number of occasions.  
 In recognition that non-adversarial ADR processes such as mediation can result in 
effective resolution of many problems faced by stakeholders, these international initiatives 
should be promoted in conjunction with the expansion of FDI into the developing world.   
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ADR may be a particularly effective means of dispute resolution in the context of 
international investment because of the often long-term nature of the relationship between 
investors and communities, the lack of resources of ordinary citizens to bring claims and their 
discomfort with formal legal processes. Uptake of ADR by investors and civil society groups  
may be achieved by the inclusion of provision for ADR facilities into the text of IIAs, as well 
as encouragement by lending institutions such as development banks.   
 Criticisms of ADR processes, such as those of the development banks and the OECD 
NCPs, which focus on the failure of these procedures to establish binding judgments that 
compel a certain course of action on the part of investors, are misplaced. This is because the 
voluntary, dialogue-based approach of mediation and other ADR techniques is attractive to 
stakeholders who cannot afford or who are intimidated by more formal procedures such as 
arbitration or the civil courts.  Similarly, investors will be drawn to these processes because 
they do not entail establishing formal legal liability and can enhance good will with local 
communities, raising their reputation and possibly facilitating future FDI.  Still, grievance 
mechanisms such as those of the development banks, the NCPs or sector specific home state 
mechanisms like the Canadian Office, can only provide part of the answer to addressing 
harms suffered by stakeholders. Mediation exercises such as those discussed herein will 
obviously not work in every situation. Broader engagement with communities on the part of 
foreign investors is needed involving relationship building and the establishment of trust, 
objectives which many of the ADR bodies discussed in this article also aim to achieve. In 
order to be effective in as many circumstances as possible, informal ADR mechanisms must 
emphasize the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable resolution to a shared problem between 
investors and other stakeholders, not apportioning liability or quantifying compensation. In 
many situations solutions will be available that satisfy the concerns of both parties, laying the 
foundation for cooperation in ongoing mutually beneficial relationships. 
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